The University of Akron

IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Intellectual Property Journal

Akron Law Journals

March 2016

The Effects of eBay: Discretion, Statutory Damages,
and Private Attorneys-General
Liam O'Melinn

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
O'Melinn, Liam (2008) "The Effects of eBay: Discretion, Statutory Damages, and Private Attorneys-General,"
Akron Intellectual Property Journal: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol2/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Intellectual Property Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more
information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.

O'Melinn: The Effects of eBay

THE EFFECTS OF EBA Y: DISCRETION, STATUTORY
DAMAGES, AND PRIVATE ATTORNEYS-GENERAL

Liam 0 'Melinn*
If it were not already an apt time to consider the effects of the
Supreme Court's eBay v. MercExchange' decision, several recent
developments serve as reminders of the importance of the issues
addressed in the case: In Capitol v. Thomas2 the recording industry has
succeeded in securing a $222,000 judgment in statutory damages for
copyright infringement, a software patent infringement suit was filed in
October 2007 by IP Innovation and Licensing against Novell and
Redhat 3-seemingly the first suit to target Linux-and the PTO has
rejected most of the claims in Amazon's 1-Click patent.4
The eBay decision appears to assert that the law of patent is not
immune to general jurisprudential principles, and it may also be the first
statement of a broad principle that peculiar tendencies exhibited by both
patent and copyright law must either be justified or jettisoned. Thus,
eBay leads to three different issues: the appropriate grounds for issuing
injunctive relief, the justifications that underlie the remedial scheme, and
the much broader issue of the role of the public interest in the law of
"Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. I would like to thank Jay Dratler, Elizabeth Reilly,
Jeff Samuels, Sam Oddi, and Tracy Thomas of the University of Akron School of Law for hosting
the First Annual Intellectual Property Forum, Maria Denisiak for all her organizational work, and
the Akron Intellectual Property Journal for publishing the forum pieces. I would also like to thank
all of the participants at the forum for a very interesting and collegial exchange.
1. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
2. Capital v. Thomas 2007 WL 2957532 (Dist. Minn.)(Jury Verdict Form); Recording
Industry vs. The People, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2007/01/index-of-litigationdocuments.html#Virgin vThomas.
3. See, e.g., Groklaw.com, Patent Infringement Lawsuit Filed Against Red Hat & Novell Just Like Ballmer Predicted, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=-20071011205044141 (last
visited January 21, 2008); Stephen Shankland, Red Hat, Novell suedfor patent infringement, CNET
News, Oct. 12, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-13580_3-9796868-39.html.
4. See Peter Calveley, Amazon One-Click Patent Rejected by the US Patent Office as a
Result of my Request, lgdmlgd, Oct. 16,2007, http://igdmlgd.blogspot.com/2007/10/amazon-oneclick-patent-rejected-by-us.html.
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patent and copyright. The decision offers an invitation which, if
accepted, should lead to a reexamination of the extension of intellectual
property law in a time of revolutionary change. If this seems too much to
claim on behalf of a modest decision that emphasizes that it is
maintaining tradition rather than departing from it, the implications of
the case are potentially enormous for two reasons: in instructing lower
courts to exercise genuine discretion in deciding whether to issue
injunctions the case may also tacitly invite judges to reevaluate the
bounds of the law in a more thorough way. Second, the case may refocus
attention on the public interest at a time when an important segment of
the public is poised to take part in a reconsideration of the premises of
patent and copyright.
The time for such reconsideration is propitious. The extension of
the law of intellectual property has led to a conflict which is reflected in
the rejection of most of Amazon's 1-Click claims and IP Innovation's
legal action against Novell and Redhat; it is a conflict that reveals a
changing landscape in patent law and potentially in copyright law as
well. Intellectual property law has been expanding nearly unchecked, in
large measure because of an imaginary connection between conventional
property rights and the rights afforded through patent and copyright law.
Up to now, the revolution in the law of intellectual property has often
been justified in the name of protection of property, and the
revolutionaries have succeeded in drawing a simple division in which
property must be protected against "piracy." Leaving aside the dubious
legal precision of the language of piracy, the argument has been an easy
one to make with public attention focused on illegal downloading of
music.
The revolution has also depended on the insular character of the
law, and the eBay decision would be important if it did nothing more
than resist the tendency to treat the law of copyright and patent as sui
generis. It promises to do more than this, though, for it comes at a time
when important developments outside the law are creating an
opportunity to subject both patent and copyright to some real
justification. The "pirate" is an unattractive and often unsophisticated
defendant, but more attractive and sophisticated defendants have been on
the scene for some time. They include a worldwide network of people
with expertise and interest in software, they are capable of representing
the public interest in a way that was heretofore unheard of, and they are
fully capable of taking advantage of eBay's invitation to investigate the
peculiar contours of patent and copyright.
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I. WHICH PAGE OF HISTORY?

If it does nothing else, the eBay decision tells us that the Supreme
Court believes that it is supreme even in matters of intellectual property.
For some time the Court seemed to avoid hard cases in the area, and
when it took hard cases, issued strangely unanimous opinions on issues
that appeared divisive to almost everyone who did not sit on the Court.
In the meantime, the Supreme Court's relationship to the Federal Circuit
has sometimes been reminiscent of the relationship between the
Supreme Court of Delaware and the Delaware Chancery in matters of
corporate law; in each case it was permissible to wonder whether the
lower court was in fact supreme within its realm. The eBay and KSR
decisions put us on notice that the Supreme Court intends to assert and
maintain its supremacy.
To what end? The three opinions leave room for uncertainty. Chief
Justice Roberts with his "page of history" admonition seems to advise
district courts that as long as their reasoning includes the appropriate
four factors, then their decisions to issue injunctions will be upheld.5
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, expresses reservations about the
direction that patent law has taken in recent years. 6 Justice Thomas
suggests that the history of American equity is well enough settled to
provide real guidance in issuing injunctive relief, so his opinion invites
as early as the passage of the first
us back to a very early point, perhaps
7
patent and copyright acts in 1790.

Given the fractured character of the decision it is tempting to
conclude that eBay will not lead anywhere important. If any of the three
opinions can be followed by lower courts, is eBay not a meaningless
decision? Not at all; its insistence on a meaningful exercise of discretion
means that lower courts can come to different results in deciding
whether to order injunctive relief. When the law tells them that they
have discretion, not only can they exercise it, but under eBay they are
required to do so. 8 That is to say, they can proceed along lines that seem
sensible without fear of automatic reversal because of a failure to
observe some semi-official canon of the law of intellectual property.

5.
6.
7.
8.

See eBay 126 S.Ct. at 1842.
Id.
Id. at 1839.
Id. at 1841.
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9
Lower-court decisions since eBay have been mixed in their results,
but it is clear that eBay (along with KSR) has given courts some pause.
This has been true even in the Eastern District of Texas, the "renegade
jurisdiction" of patent law; in z4 techs v. Microsoft° Judge Davis
refused to grant an injunction. Following KSR, Judge Davis also issued a
judgment for defendants in AdvanceMe v. Rapidpay" on the basis of
anticipation and obviousness. In the Federal Circuit, LeapFrog
Enterprises v. Fisher-Price'2 suggests that KSR's teaching on
obviousness has been accepted, and In Re Seagate Technology 13 has
recast the standard for adjudication of willfulness leading to the
imposition of enhanced damages. Of course, in a formal sense the
Court's teaching has to be accepted, but as Delaware's Chancery has
shown, when it comes to corporate law, it is one thing for a supreme
court to say what the law is, and quite another to enforce it on a lower
court with an (at least) equal claim to expertise and no small amount of
pride. If both the Federal Circuit and the Eastern District of Texas are
acknowledging the Supreme Court's authority in a genuine fashion,
whether grudgingly or gladly, that in itself suggests that the eBay
decision is having a real effect.
Furthermore, given that the three opinions are concerned with the
exercise of discretion, whether eBay commands reluctant courts to come
to a particular outcome in a given case is not the only test of its
influence. In fact, it may be more important to consider the effect of the
case on lower courts that are already inclined to deny injunctions.
Previously, they had been told to exercise their discretion in accord with
a strong presumption in favor of injunctive relief, and an exercise of
discretion in the wrong direction courted reversal. The vindication of the
discretion of the lower courts is a very important result in the case,
perhaps more important than any direct effect the case can have on either
patent or copyright doctrine. One can see this influence in the eBay case
on remand' 4 and in Phelps v. Galloway,15 a Fourth Circuit case that was
Injunction,
The
Fire
of
Genius,
9. See
Joe
Miller,
http://www.thefireofgenius.com/injunctions (last visited January 21, 2008) (cataloguing the relevant
post-eBay injunction cases).
10. 434 F.Supp.2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 1 am grateful to Teresa McCall for bringing
this case to my attention very shortly after it was decided, and I note that she was arguing then that
eBay would have a real influence.
11. 2007 WL 2350644 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
12. 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
13. See generally, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
14. MercExchange v. eBay, 500 F.Supp.2d 556, 592 (E.D. Va. 2007).
15. 492 F.3d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 2007). (superseding Phelps v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128 (4th
Cir. 2007)).
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decided shortly after eBay and then decided again on rehearing. Both of
these cases provide instances of a real and unusual spirit of inquiry,
suggesting that one immediate effect of the case is to leave judges free to
engage in serious reasoning in arriving at a judgment.
It should be no surprise that Judge Friedman, having denied the
request for injunctive relief in eBay the first time around, did not have a
change of heart on remand. Nonetheless, his remand opinion shows a
more serious and robust consideration of the four factors. Additionally,
the opinion provides interesting treatment of MercExchange's use of its
patent, the nature of the patent (business method), and the public
interest. Also, on remand Judge Friedman starkly altered a preliminary
observation he had made initially, a change obviously commanded by
the Supreme Court's decision. Previously, he had noted that the
plaintiffs enjoyed a presumption to injunctive relief,16 and in the remand
opinion, he (no doubt happily) observed that there was no such
presumption.' 7 Next, where he had formerly stated that the nature of the
patent at issue was relevant, now he expressed a more strident and
thoroughgoing skepticism. Friedman noted the "questionable nature of
many business method patents," which had prompted the adoption of
second level review by the PTO as well as words of caution from a "four
member panel of the Supreme Court."' 8 In the first opinion, Judge
Friedman noted a "growing concern" over business method patents and
the implementation of second level review, but concluded that the public
interest favored neither party.' 9 On remand, the public interest factor
favored eBay.
The influence of eBay can be seen in another case in which the
court did what it had done previously, but this time proceeding without
fear of authority. Phelps v. Galloway is an architectural copyright case
decided in the Fourth Circuit which relies on eBay, and which also
provides an interesting analysis of whether an injunction should issue to
20
prevent the sale of a home that infringes an architectural copyright.
The case was decided again on rehearing; the first decision rested in part
on an interesting but legally questionable ruling based on the first sale
doctrine. (The original Phelps decision also refers to eBay, but the later
opinion shows signs that the Supreme Court's instructions had received

16.
17.
18.
19.

MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 695, 711-12 (E.D. Va. 2003).
eBay 11, 500 F.Supp.2d at 568.
Id.
at 574.
eBay 1,275 F.Supp.2dat713-14.

20.

Phelps, 492 F.3d at 546.
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more mature consideration.) 2' Interestingly (and perhaps impossibly),
the court suggested that plaintiff Phelps had satisfied the first two prongs
of the inquiry, irreparable harm and inadequacy of monetary damages,
but ruled that the injunction to prohibit resale which it sought would not
be granted
based upon weighing the balance of harms and public
22
policy.

The court asserted that architect-plaintiff Phelps had been fully
compensated for the infringement, while an injunction against the sale of
the house would work a real hardship on Galloway. 23 More interestingly,
the opinion also stated that the architectural work possesses a
"predominantly functional character. ' ,24 To a certain extent, the court
was repackaging its first sale argument, but the implications are large,
given the reservation that they seem to express about the copyrightability
of buildings. According to the court, functionality prevented buildings
from receiving copyright protection until a very late date, and the
opinion hints that they should never have received such protection. 25
Further, in the court's view, longstanding public policy against
restricting alienation commands a similar result, and as in eBay on
remand, the intrusion of public policy into the decision of whether to
grant injunctive relief is notable.
Each court appears to have discovered in the eBay decision an
invitation to engage in serious reasoning as well as permission to find
the appropriate result. It is a reasonable objection that in both cases the
courts wound up doing what they would have done anyway. But what is
remarkable is that now they were able to do it with the permission of the
law. Now, courts may engage in nuanced reasoning in order to come to a
sensible conclusion, rather than bowing to an unavoidable consequence
of the special character of intellectual property. In this connection it is
interesting that the Phelps decision noted that other injunctive relief
might be available, such as destruction of the infringing plans or their
return to Phelps, despite the denial of the injunction against Galloway's
sale of the house.26

21.

Phelps v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2007) abrogatedon rehearing,492. F.3d 532

(4th Cir. 2007).
22.
23.
24.

Phelps, 492 F.3d at 544.
Id.
Id.

25. Id. at 544-45.
26. Id. at 546-47.
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II. THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE REMEDIAL SCHEME: THE PLAINTIFF
AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

In denying injunctive relief, the eBay case on remand also mentions
the possibility of enhanced damages for patent infringement, 27 which
raises the next issue that the Supreme Court's decision should implicate.
The, decision in In Re Seagate, which changes the standard by which
willfulness is established, strongly suggests that the Federal Circuit has
understood eBay as a warning that is not confined to injunctions. 28 The
next question is whether the warning extends to copyright, where the
analogue to enhanced damages is the award of statutory damages, which
range in general from a minimum of $750 for each infringement to a
maximum of $30,000. The recording industry's war against
downloading has brought this issue to the forefront in recent years, as
the industry has been seeking and receiving statutory damages without
having to prove harm as a consequence of infringement. In a related
vein, the recording industry has also succeeded in several instances on a
theory that equates distribution under 106(3) with "making available"
songs to others, even without proof that anyone actually downloaded the
songs that were made available.
The awards of enhanced damages in patent and statutory damages
in copyright law would seem to be insular features that defy general
principles of jurisprudence. Thus, an important consequence of the eBay
decision should be to focus attention on the justification, or lack thereof,
for a remedial regime which approves damages that are unrelated to
harm. The recent award of $222,000 in Capitol v. Thomas,29 a case
involving online filesharing of songs, brings the question into sharp
relief: What did defendant
Jammie Thomas do that warranted a
30
judgment of this size?
The easy answer is probably that the award is designed to protect a
property right threatened by the specter of "piracy." However, this
answer is very similar to the one that the eBay Court rejected as to why
injunctive relief should issue as a matter of course in cases of patent
infringement. The property answer also betrays a certain insouciance
because it rests on rather imprecise notions of the nature of the property
27. MercExchange v. eBay, 500 F.Supp.2d 556, 581 (E.D. Va. 2007).
28. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
29. See Capital v. Thomas 2007 WL 2957532 (Dist. Minn. 2007).
30. The argument on statutory damages is based largely on Liam Sdamus O'Melinn, Software
and Shovels: How the Intellectual Property Revolution is Undermining Traditional Concepts of
Property, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 143 (2007).
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at issue and depends to an undue extent on an ill-defined conflict
between property and piracy. This is an area of the law in which, after
all, the imputation of piracy can substitute for a careful inquiry into
whether the pirate actually engaged in activity prohibited by law.
Apparently, statutory damages are easily justified by a general
recognition that bad things should happen to bad people.
An interesting test of this theory-that statutory damages are
quietly accepted because they happen to bad people-is provided in
BMG v. Gonzalez,31 a Seventh Circuit decision with an opinion written
by Judge Easterbrook. BMG was awarded statutory damages without a
jury trial. It is curious that Judge Easterbrook, who has more than an
ordinary interest in jurisprudential questions, showed little interest in the
justification for statutory damages. Rather, he gleefully awarded them,
hinting along the way that the award was based not only on the 30 songs
judgment,
that actually formed the basis of BMG's motion for summary
32
but on another 1300 downloads that were not at issue.
Judge Easterbrook might not show the same indignation if faced
with a defendant who had breached a contract. Indeed, the efficient
breacher might well win the Judge's acclaim. Although we might think
that the difference is that copyright infringement involves the violation
of a property right rather than a breach of contract, in the Easterbrook
court, at least, such an explanation should be insufficient. After all,
Easterbrook is a prominent spokesman for a very powerful school of
thought that claims that law is a matter of contract, and that statutes are
simply default terms which contractors are free to negotiate around.33
It is a general jurisprudential principle that the plaintiff who proves
a breach of contract must also prove damages. As a threshold matter, the
plaintiff who is unable to articulate particular concrete injury is typically
denied standing. The lack of an articulated connection between statutory
damages and any assertion of actual harm in copyright law calls for real
justification.
Why is relief not tied to a showing of harm in copyright, and why is
harm presumed once copying has been shown? For the answer to these
questions there is no better place to turn than to a little-noted article
written by David Ladd, former Register of Copyrights, entitled "The
Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright Law." 34 According to Ladd,
31. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
32. Id.at 889.
33. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15
(1984).
34.

David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright Law, 30 J. COPYR. SOCY
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it is inappropriate in copyright law to require the plaintiff to show harm
because copyright law serves a critical social interest by preserving a
delicate system which encourages efforts by authors and publishers that
result in a harvest of knowledge.3 5
The concept of the harvest of knowledge is a common one which
enjoyed its most famous exposition in Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises.36 Ladd's explanation of the dangers of adding a harm
requirement to copyright law casts the metaphor in a new light. In his
view, a connection between harm and standing would threaten a delicate
public balance and would mistakenly impose a private law standard in
an area of public law. 37 To be clear, Ladd might not endorse the precise
wording here. In particular, he might object to characterizing copyright
as public law, but that is the import of his argument.
Strikingly, even public law usually requires some proof of harm, a
fact which calls attention to the extraordinary character of the remedial
structure of intellectual property. In constitutional law, for example,
harm is generally required in order to establish standing. The contrast is
instructive and points away from the private property understanding that
is often advanced in support of intellectual property rules. The standing
rule in copyright appears similar to the unusual case in constitutional law
in which the mere enactment of an unconstitutional measure is presumed
to inflict harm. Apparently, the reason for the constitutional law
exception is the same one Ladd offers for copyright: when a delicate
social balance is at issue, as in some First Amendment Establishment
Clause cases, the rules change regarding the requirement of injury. It is
not clear that the law is completely consistent on this point, but it is not
too much to say that "First Amendment values" are so important and so
easily trampled that we cannot wait for them to be invaded before
allowing restrictive measures to be challenged.
What this says for the copyright plaintiff is a surprising departure
from the Lockean justification that seems often to lurk just below the
surface of the law, a justification which creates enormous pressure to
allow plaintiffs to protect their property at all costs. The copyright
plaintiff whose claim stems from the importance of the harvest of
knowledge is more like a private attorney-general than a disappointed
Lockean laborer. The statute that provides for significant damages even
in the absence of demonstrated harm would appear to be tougher than
421 (1983).
35. Id. at 422-23.
36. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
37. Ladd, supra note 34, at 422.
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the statute that serves merely as a default rule for contractors. The rather
unusual nature of intellectual property remedies calls for a more nuanced
appreciation of the public interest in copyright and patent law.
If the copyright plaintiff is better conceived as a public attorneygeneral than as a disappointed Lockean laborer, then perhaps the
patentee who qualifies for enhanced damages enjoys a similar status.
One might object that patent law is different in this regard because the
famous ContinentalPaperBag 8 case long ago rejected a theory that the
patentee is a quasi-trustee of the public interest. The Supreme Court
insisted that the patent conferred a property right that did not have to be
exercised in the public interest.
Yet, such a simple and categorical argument does not seem to
satisfy the standards set out for injunctive relief in eBay. The
Continental Paper Bag era is presumably the page in history to which
Chief Justice Roberts would direct our attention, but it is only one page
among many. Moreover, given that eBay allows lower courts to take
more serious account of questions concerning what constitutes
irreparable injury, the adequacy of money damages, balancing of
hardships, and public policy, what is to stop such reasoning from
reaching beyond the question of injunctive relief and into other matters
of obvious public concern?
In declaring that injunctive relief must be awarded carefully and on
the basis of traditional legal principles, eBay would seem to say the same
with respect to statutory damages in copyright law and enhanced
damages in patent law. Indeed, as suggested above, the Federal Circuit
has changed its view of what constitutes willfulness in the setting of
enhanced damages. Clearly, it is time to consider the issue more deeply,
because if it is correct to conclude that the copyright or patent plaintiff is
a private attorney-general, then some important consequences should
follow.
III. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: EBAY'S FUTURE
EFFECTS

To say that the copyright or patent plaintiff is a private attorneygeneral is to issue an implicit challenge to the view that equates
copyright with conventional property. Even if the Continental Paper
Bag Court was correct in asserting that a patentee is not a quasi-trustee
of the public good in the sense that it was under a requirement to use its
38. Continental Paper Bag Company v. Eastern Paper Bag Company, 210 U.S. 405, 424
(1908).
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patent in accord with the public interest, the law nevertheless should
recognize that the remedial scheme of copyright and patent appear to
award a rather elevated status to the plaintiff.
This recognition has a practical implication. If the holders of
copyrights, for example, benefit from a relaxed rule of standing and are
relieved of the burden of proving damages because of the important
social interests that are promoted by the Copyright Act, but are not
required to act in the public interest, it seems that someone ought to be
allowed to stand for those interests. If plaintiffs benefit from a doctrine
that equates infringement with harm, why should defendants in such
cases not also be able to benefit from a doctrine that resembles the
overbreadth doctrine that is often applied in First Amendment cases? In
other words, the remedial scheme of copyright law leads to the
conclusion that greater attention should be paid not only to the rights of
actual defendants, but to the rights of a broader range of people whose
interests are to be affected by a decision in the case. Such an approach
would not be entirely new to the law of copyright, for it was the
approach taken implicitly by the Supreme Court in Sony 39 when the
court excused infringing uses on the basis of non-infringing uses.
IV. EBAYAS

A SIGN OF THE TIMES AND A PORTENT

To overemphasize the influence of the eBay case is unwarranted.
Apparently, there are still more decisions granting injunctive relief than
denying it.40 Additionally, some commentators reasonably argue that
neither eBay nor KSR signals a real change in the law. Yet the decision
deserves consideration from another point of view-that eBay is a sign
of the times. Justice Kennedy's suspicion of the business method patent
is widely shared and raises an issue that goes far beyond remedies for
infringement. As noted above, it may be that eBay offers judges the
opportunity and perhaps permission to manifest skepticism in a manner
that is consistent with the public interest. This skepticism is merited and
calls for real inquiry into the nature of the rights at issue-as opposed to
a summary declaration that the right being protected is a property right.
The rejection of twenty-one out of twenty-six of Amazon's 1-Click
patent claims, 4' the recent decisions by the Federal Circuit that
watermark signals are not patentable 42 and that an attempt to patent
39. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
40. Miller, supra note 9.
41. Calveley, supra note 4.
42.

Eric Yeager, Watermark Signals are Not Patentable Subject Matter Under Any Section
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mental processes leading to arbitration seeks "to patent the use of human
intelligence in and of itself' 43 suggest that change is afoot at many
levels. Indeed, Judge Friedman's reasoning in the eBay remand was
affected by the fact that one of the patents at issue, the '265 patent,'
might be invalidated given the interim office rejection of each of its
claims subsequent to the first decision but pre-KSR.4
The observation that many believe the patent system is broken is
nothing new. What is new and has perhaps not been sufficiently
observed is the increasing importance of activity from a segment of the
public calling for reform and helping to achieve it. If the eBay decision
has the effect of calling for a greater consideration of the public interest,
then that may be its most important long-term consequence. Once the
public is invited to the intellectual property table, there are formidable
interests which can represent it admirably. The assault on Amazon's 1Click patent claims was brought about largely by New Zealand
blogger/actor Peter Calveley.45 Calveley is not a lawyer, but he notes
that he thought KSR might be decided as it was and thus in his request
for reexamination he discussed two of the cases eventually cited by the
Supreme Court.4 6 Calveley raised the reexamination fee via
contributions from people who read his blog.
Likewise, many of the difficulties encountered by SCO in its
litigation against IBM derived from the involvement of a world of
programmers connected via the web.47 The suit has been policed and
publicized vigorously by the Groklaw.net website,4 8 a site which was
created and maintained by Pamela Jones. It appears that SCO was
counting on a traditional private dispute and was unprepared for public
scrutiny. What transpired was a much more modem public dispute in
which the eyes of the world--or at least the programming part of the
world-were upon the matter. As people involved in free and open
source software like to say, with many eyes all software bugs are
shallow. We are now learning that many eyes can also have a salutary
101 Category, 74 PAT., TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. 631 (Sept. 28, 2007) (discussing In re
Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
43. Eric Yeager, Mental Processesfor Arbitrationare Unpatentable,Abstract Ideas, 74 PAT.,
TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT J. 633 (Sept. 28, 2007) (quoting In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365,
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effect on the law by detecting deep bugs that would once have gone
unnoticed.
With the filing of a patent infringement suit in the Eastern District
of Texas by IP Innovation and Technology Licensing against Redhat and
Novell, 49 a battle that has been foreshadowed for some time by the
Microsoft/Novell patent peace accord, appears to have been joined. A
very wide variety of interests will likely be implicated and the public is
poised to take part to an unprecedented extent, in no small measure
because of the interest of a group of programmers. The fact that many of
those programmers are members of the free and open source software
movements means that a serious new influence has arrived. They have
previously been consigned to the rank of "hacker" and often associated
with anarchy. The extension of intellectual property rights has been
aided in an important way by the convenience of having defendants who
can easily be characterized as "pirates." The argument that a respect for
property in general requires heightened attention to the demands of
intellectual property is an easy case to make when the issue is framed in
terms of online downloading of copyrighted material by lawless
anarchists and pirates. It is a more difficult one to make when the
defendants include notable programmers and major corporations.
The eBay decision threatens to be important for two principle
reasons. It tells judges that they are to use their discretion wisely and it
tells them to do so on the eve of a new kind of legal conflict. Now, the
"anarchists" are poised to bring the public to the intellectual property
table, perhaps for the first time in history. The outcome of the conflict is
by no means certain, but they have a very good chance of reintroducing
the concept of the public interest to a body of law that has threatened to
forget that the public is worth considering. If the further-reaching
implications of the eBay decision materialize, the case will have
contributed to one of the most remarkable developments in modern law
by aiding in the introduction of the public to patent and copyright law.
Such an outcome is not a shabby result to emerge from a fractured
decision.

49. Supra note 3.
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